Accident No. _____

Date

Checked by _____

Analyzed by C M W

Copied for Wright Field by No Copy

Notes _____

Photo mailed AF Inspector and Gen Myers 12-21-44 by dla

1225:9-43

WAR DEPARTMENT
AAF Form No. 14
(Rev. 1 Oct. '44)

ARMY AIR FORCES
REPORT OF MAJOR ACCIDENT

CONFIDENTIAL

Use this form in accordance with ... "Aircraft Accident Investigator's Handbook" issued by Office of Flying Safety, Headquarters, AAF.

Fill in all spaces except where otherwise indicated.

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If additional space is needed, use additional sheet(s) and identify by proper section letter and subsection number.

FIELD OFFICES—DO NOT USE THIS SPACE	DATE
Pre. Form ... Rec'd	11-29
Form 14 Received	12-121
Evaluated by	
Verified by 3L4	12-20
Checked by E.S.	12-19
Coded by	34286

Accident No. 45-11-28-5
Type, Model and Series
No. Aircraft Involved

Section A—GENERAL INFORMATION

1. Place of Accident—State, County, Nearest Town, Distance and Direction from Same: Kansas - Saline - Assaria 73-1699		Nearest Army Airfield, Distance and Direction from Same: Smoky Hill Army Air Field SSW	
2. Was Collision With Other Aircraft? [ ] Yes [X] No	AF Nos. of Aircraft Involved (File separate Form 14 for each aircraft)	Date: 28Nov1944	Hour and Time Zone: 1840CWT 3 — [ ] Day [X] Night

Section B—AIRCRAFT

1. Aircraft No.: 42-24578 No indication of series	2. Type B, Model 29, Series 40	3. Home Station: Smoky Hill AA Field 7379		
4. Air Force or Command: 2 AF	Subcommand	Wing: 17	Group No. and Type: 247 AAFBU OTU (VH) 245	Squadron
5. Date of Manufacture: 8 July 1944	Total Hours: 317:00	Date Last Overhaul: no overhaul	Overhauling Depot or Sub-depot	Hours Since Overhaul

6. Attach detailed statement of tech orders having direct bearing on this accident which have not been complied with. Describe orders and give reasons for noncompliance.

Section C—OPERATOR (Person at controls at time of accident)

1. Last Name: Miller	First Name: Alan	Middle Initial: M.	Grade: Captain	Branch: AC	ASN: 0-412870	Sex: M	Age: 26
2. Attached Station: Smoky Hill AA Field 7379	AF or Command: 2AF 2	Subcommand: XXI BC 847		Wing: 314	Group No. and Type: 39BVH BVH		Squadron: 60 BVH
3. Assigned Station: Same (1) Same	AF or Command	Subcommand		Wing	Group No. and Type		Squadron
4. Aeronautical Rating? [X] Yes [ ] No	Present Rating: Pilot		Date Received: 25April 41	5. Normal Duty Status: Flight Commander of B-29 Flight			

Section D—OPERATOR'S FLYING EXPERIENCE (Including civilian)

Flying Time	1st Pilot or Solo Student	Other Pilot or Other Student
1. Total Hours	1623:15	382:15
2. Hours This Type	733:00	211:10
3. Hours This Model	55:15	55:10
4. Hours Last 90 Days	55:15	29:10
5. Hours Last 30 Days	42:10	11:40
6. Hours Last 24 Hours	0:22	0:00
7. Actual Combat Hours	0:00	0:00

Fill in items 8 and 9 only if operator was student in training or rated pilot in CIS, OTU, etc.

8. Trainee Class No. and School, CTU, OCTS, Etc.: 1st Phase OTU VH, 39Grp., 60S

9. Phase and Hours in This Phase

Phase	Dual or Copilot	Solo or 1st Pilot
1st	11:40	42:40

10. AAF Schools Previously Attended and Dates

Primary Flight	compl.Nov.1940
Basic Flight	compl.Feb.1941
Advanced 2E	compl.April'41
4 Eng Trans	comp. May 1943
4 Eng Trans	comp.July 1943

11. Instrument Rating

Type	Date
White	16 Sept 1944
Last Check Station: Alamagordo	16 Sept 1944

12. Was operator on instruments at time of accident or immediately before? [X] Yes [ ] No

If answer to number 12 is Yes, or if accident occurred at night or under instrument or unknown conditions, fill in items 13 through 17.

Hours	1st Pilot	Other
13. Total—Instrument	303:15	25:15
14. Instrument Last 6 Mos.	11:35	7:10
15. Instrument Last Flight	6:00	1:30
16. Night, Last 6 Mos.	23:25	4:35
17. Night, Last 30 Days	18:10	3:30

Section E—PERSONNEL INVOLVED (Including operator and all other persons, whether in plane or not)

Duty at Time of Accident (1)	Name (Last Name First) (2)	Type of Aero. Rating (Symbols) (3)	Serial No. (4)	Grade and Branch of Service (5)	Pers. Class. Symbol (AAF Reg. 15-1) (6)	Org. Assignment—Air Force or Command Group Number and Type Station (7)	Fatal Major Minor None Missing or Unknown (8)	Parachutes Used Yes (9)	Used No (10)	Successful Yes (11)	Successful No (12)
P	Miller, Alan M.	P	0-412870	Captain	01	2AF39BVH SHAAF	Fatal		X		
CP	Phillips, Lewis S.	P	0-830911	2nd Lt.	18	" " "	Fatal		X		
N	Barthel, William F.	AO/N	0-725841	Captain	01	" " "	None	X		X	
B	Bennett, William J.	AO/B	0-734870	1st Lt.	01	" " "	Maj.	X			X
IB	Charles, Edward T. Jr.	AO/BN	0-670002	1st Lt.	18	2AF247BU SHAAF	Fatal	X			X
E	Shope, Perry F.		19018071	T/Sgt.	38	2AF39BVH SHAAF	None	X		X	
R	McGinley, John J.		37611279	Pvt.	38	" " "	Fatal		X		
G	Nandino, John E.		39568287	Cpl.	38	" " "	Fatal		X		
G	Fries, Leslie P.		20365244	Cpl.	38	" " "	Fatal		X		
G	Gavin, John H.		31370021	Cpl.	38	" " "	Fatal		X		
V	Gilbert, Earl J.		33515150	Cpl.	38	" " "	Fatal		X		
G	Garner, Henry G.		31369380	Cpl.	38	" " "	None	X		X	
AFCE	Anderson, John W.		37198752	Sgt.			Fatal		X		
IG	DeMoss, Ralph C.		14065328			2AF247BU SHAAF	Fatal		X		
IR	Vandernoole, Victor M.		17076160		38	" " "	None	X		X	

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RESTRICTED WHEN ENTRIES ARE MADE HEREON

Section F—DAMAGE

Describe briefly the extent of the damage which occurred. (If no damage, write "None." If aircraft is missing, write "Missing." If aircraft was totally wrecked, so state)

1. To Aircraft

Total Wreck

	1	2	3	4
2. To Engine	Total Wreck	Total Wreck	Total Wreck	Total Wreck
3. To Propeller	Total Wreck	Total Wreck	Total Wreck	Total Wrekk

4. To Private Property (Explain on Attachments) Several trees burned where aircraft hit the ground. Vehicle tracks across winter wheat field where crash equipment proceeded to accident.

Section G—POWER PLANT FAILURE

(Use this section of the form if power plant failure was a contributing cause factor in the accident. This must be signed by engineering officer)

1. Duration of Flight Since Last Take-off: Hours 0 Minutes 22

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
2. Engine Model	R-3350-23-A	R-3350-23-A	R-3350-23-A	R-3350-23-A
3. Engine No.	DW 200497	DW 200488	DW 200360	42-&415
4. Engine-Hours Since Last Major Overhaul	No overhaul	No overhaul	No overhaul	106:05
5. Depot or Sub-depot Performing Overhaul				OOASC
6. Total Engine-Hours	317:00	317:00	317:00	130:05
7. Propeller Model	Hamilton Standard Full Feathering	Same	Same	Same
8. Propeller-Hours Since Major Overhaul	No overhaul	No overhaul	No overhaul	No overhaul

9. Statement of Operator, if Available, on Behavior of Power Plant and Manipulation of Controls Immediately Before Failure

Operator deceased. See inclosure #3----Flight Engineer's statement

10. Statement of Engineering Officer, Mechanics, and Others as to What Failed and Probable Reasons Why There were several cylinders on both #2 and #3 engines, which were found to be in unsatisfactory condition. The guides had worn sufficiently to allow undue motion of the valve. On #3 there were three (3) valves found this way; on # 2 there were two (2). The following condition existed in #3 engine:
(see attachment) 1. #1 Exhaust valve had a cracked periphery, the guide was worn.

11. Octane Rating of Fuel: 100

Engineering Officer (Name, Grade, and Station): Douglas Symington, Maj. A.C. SAAAF, Salina Kansas

Section H—AIRFRAME, LANDING GEAR, OR OTHER MATÉRIEL

(Use this section if matériel failure was a contributing cause factor in the accident. This must be signed by engineering officer)

1. Describe the Matériel Failure, Including Statement of Kind of Flight at the Time of Failure and All Factors Which Might Have Contributed Toward the Failure

No indication of materiel failure other than reported in Section G above.

490 -1-

Engineering Officer (Name, Grade, and Station) ➔ Douglas Symington Maj. A.C. SAAAF Salina Kansas

Section I—SPECIAL EQUIPMENT

(Use this section if special equipment—parachutes, radio, dinghies, oxygen equipment, fire extinguishers, etc.—was a contributing cause factor in the accident for any reason including failure, misuse, or by reason of not being in the plane)

1. Describe How the Special Equipment Contributed to the Accident or to Its Results No indication of failure of special equipment. Lt. Charles unsuccessful use of parachute was due to bailing out at too low an altitude. The parachute had spilled, but had not billowed out when he struck the ground.

Lt. Bennett suffered major injury when he saw he was going to land in a graveyard and tried to control his direction of descent by shroud lines. This proved unsuccessful, and as he landed he struck a tombstone, fracturing his left leg.

16—43039-1

(Use this section if the airport or its facilities or airways facilities were a contributing factor in the accident, either because of inadequacy, condition, or poor maintenance)

1. EXPLAIN

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No contributing factors.

Section K—WEATHER (This must be signed by weather officer of the reporting station)

1. WHAT WAS THE WEATHER AT THE TIME AND PLACE OF THE ACCIDENT? Overcast of stratocumulus measured at 869 feet above terrain. Visibility 4 miles with restrictions in haze. Wind NNW at 22mph.

2. IF WEATHER WAS A FACTOR IN THE ACCIDENT, STATE HOW AND ATTACH COPY OF WEATHER REPORTS It was a psychological factor since pilot was on instruments, descending thru overcast when fire was first discovered in #2 engine. Icing level was at surface. Other pilots flying during same period stated they picked up a little light rime-ice in the overcast; however, there is no indication that this was a contributing cause to the accident. (Weather statements are attached).

WEATHER OFFICER (Name, Grade, and Station) ➡ [signature] Capt. AC [illegible], Salina, Kan.

Section L—GENERAL INFORMATION

1. IF ERROR ON THE PART OF SOMEONE OTHER THAN THE OPERATOR WAS A FACTOR, STATE HOW

No errors on the part of anyone other than the operator is indicated.

NF

2. WHAT WAS THE MISSION?	3. DID FIRE OCCUR UPON CRASHING?
Instrument practice and landings for the co-pilot under direction of Airplane Commander.	[X] Yes [ ] No

4. WERE THERE ANY VIOLATIONS OF ORDERS OR REGULATIONS? (Explain)

No violations.

5. DISCIPLINARY ACTION TAKEN OR CONTEMPLATED

No disciplinary action taken or contemplated.

6. KIND OF CLEARANCE (Attach Form 23)	FROM	TO	OR LOCAL	STATION OF LAST DEPARTURE
IFR Local	Local Range Practice			SHAAF, Salina, Kansas

7. IF UR FORM 54 HAS BEEN SUBMITTED ON ANY FEATURE INVOLVED IN THE ACCIDENT, GIVE UR NO. AND DATE	NO.	DATE
No UR submitted.		

EXPLAIN FULLY AND ATTACH COPY

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DEC 12 1944

Winston-Salem, N.C.

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8. ARE COPIES OF AAF FORMS 1, 1A, ATTACHED HERETO AS REQUIRED BY AAF REGULATION 62-14?	9. ARE PHOTOS ATTACHED?
[X] Yes [ ] No Destroyed in crash.	[X] Yes [ ] No

16—41009-1

Section M—DESCRIPTION OF THE ACCIDENT

1. TELL IN NARRATIVE FORM, IN AS MUCH DETAIL AS NECESSARY, EVERYTHING THAT IS KNOWN ABOUT THE ACCIDENT. BE SURE TO COVER EVERYTHING THAT MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TOWARD THE ACCIDENT. INCLUDE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION TO PREVENT SIMILAR ACCIDENTS, AND ACTION TAKEN

B-29 #42-24578, with Capt. Alan M. Miller as Airplane Commander, took off at 1819 CWT 28 Nov 1944 from Smoky Hill Army Air Field, Salina, Kansas, on a routine training flight to practice instruments on the Salina Range and to give the co-pilot, 2nd Lt. Lewis S. Phillips some transition landings under the direction of the Airplane Commander. (Capt. Miller was designated an instructor pilot within his Squadron). They climbed to an altitude of 800 feet-just below the overcast, which was measured at 870 at that time, and circled the field and called the tower for instructions. The tower cleared him to proceed with his instrument practice and assigned him an altitude of 5000 feet. The pilot began his ascent thru the overcast, heading North on the range. On the way up the #3 engine began running rough and power was reduced on that engine to 2000 rpm and 30" manifold pressure. They broke out of the overcast at an altitude of 5000 feet and after a discussion between the pilot and flight engineer, it was decided to feather #3 engine. The flight engineer stated that he shut off the fuel supply to that engine and the investigation substantiates this fact. The pilot then contacted the tower for emergency landing instructions. The tower replied and gave him the direction of traffic and the altimeter setting and cleared him to let down and enter traffic. During this period of six or seven minutes (according to the engineer's testimony) the instruments were all reading normal on the other three engines. Shortly after entering the overcast, the left scanner called to the flight engineer that the #2 engine was on fire. The sequence of events right in here are hard to determine, but at 1840CWT the tower officer on duty, Capt. Gurius, overheard the pilot advise the crew either to abandon, or prepare to abandon, the ship. The tower operator immediately called the ship and asked for his altitude and position. The pilot replied that he didn't know his position, but that he was at 2600 feet indicated. Capt. Gurius stated that it could not have been over 15 to 20 seconds later that he observed a flash of flame approximately five or six miles southwest of the field.

According to the Bombardier's testimony, the pilot notified the crew on interphone to stand by to bail out, and motioned him to get out of the nose. The bombardier immediately put on his chute, and realizing there was trouble, turned around and tripped the bomb bay door release. Some member of the crew in the rear of the plane acknowledged that the doors were open. As the bombardier passed between the pilot and co-pilot, he asked the co-pilot if he was ready to bail out. The co-pilot apparently was "frozen" and sat there with his hands on his knees and said nothing. Immediately afterward, it was reported, the pilot left his seat; turned around, and yelled for the crew to get out of the plane, and also for someone to bring him his parachute. The navigator, in the meantime, had put on his parachute and come forward, and he and the bombardier were facing each other over the wheel well, which they opened and found the gear still up. Someone yelled to put the gear down. It is believed the pilot tripped the toggle switch and put the gear down. The navigator was the first one out, the bombardier second, then the radio operator. There were two radio operators aboard. The Instructor Radio Oper. put his chute on, got one leg strap on, came around the turret, and when he got there, the bombardier noticed that he had his chute on upside down and one leg strap fastened. He called the Instructor Radio Operator's attention to it and then bailed out. The Instructor Radio Operator, after re-adjusting his chute, started to slide down thru (see attached sheet)

2. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. This board recommends that valve check teams be organized under Maintenance Control and these be the only persons authorized to check valves.

2. Recommend an intense program stressing emergency procedures and frequent bail-out practices.

3. Further recommend that all hose clamps securing the rubber hose to the fuel pump be included in the daily inspection of the aircraft and checked for proper tightness.

3. ACTION TAKEN Valve check crews are now being organized at this station and training directives are being published, stressing emergency procedures and parachute discipline. In an effort to eliminate further accidents of this type, the following remedial action will be taken at this station immediately:

a. The pre-flight inspection of the combat crew by the airplane commander will include a careful rehearsal of bail-out procedures, explaining to every man (see attached sheet)

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATING BOARD FROM REPORTING STATION. EACH MEMBER MUST SIGN.

STATION: Smoky Hill Army Air Field, Salina, Kansas

NAME—PRESIDENT: Potter B. Paige	NAME—MEMBER: Ralph W. Rodieck	NAME—INTELLIGENCE OFFICER: William E. Delooche
GRADE: Colonel, AC	GRADE: Colonel, AC	GRADE: Captain, AC
ORGANIZATION: 39th Bomb Gp (VH)	ORGANIZATION: 247th AAFBU	ORGANIZATION: 247th AAFBU
NAME—MEMBER: Morris H. Shedd	NAME—MEDICAL OFFICER: Herbert C. Merillat	NAME—RECORDER: Clark A. Tate
GRADE: Lt. Col., AC	GRADE: Lt. Col.	GRADE: Major, AC
ORGANIZATION: 247th AAFBU	ORGANIZATION: MC, 247th AAFBU	ORGANIZATION: 247th AAFBU

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1—41020-1

CONFIDENTIAL

BASE WEATHER STATION
Smoky Hill Army Air Field
Salina, Kansas

29 November 1944

SUBJECT: Summary of Weather at Smoky Hill AAF, Salina, Kans., from 1300 CWT to 2400 CWT 28 November 1944.

TO: Base Operations Officer, Smoky Hill AAF, Salina, Kansas.

1. Weather sequence of 1830 CWT, 28 November 1944:

OSN E1@5H [illegible]7/33/24[illegible]22/016

2. Synoptic Situation: A small cold front first began to form in this region in the vicinity of Dodge City, Kansas approximately at 0130 CWT 28 Nov. This front intensified and moved eastward, passing Salina at 1430 CWT of the same day. With the passage of the front, the surface wind at this field shifted to north-northwest and increased in velocity, reaching 25 mph at 1530 CWT. With the northerly winds, cold air was brought into the Salina area from the north. This air was unstable and formed low stratocumulus clouds, bases averaging 3,000' MSL and tops 5,000' MSL.

3. Sky Cover during the period 1300 CWT to 2400 CWT 28 Nov: At 1300 CWT sky was overcast with two layers, upper layer of altostratus clouds, 10/10ths, bases 8,000' MSL tops 10,000' MSL, and lower layer of stratocumulus clouds, 6/10, bases 6,000' MSL tops 7,000' MSL. At 1430 CWT with the passage of the cold front the stratocumulus clouds began to lower, with amount of clouds becoming overcast, bases 3,000' MSL tops 4,000' MSL (ceiling measured as 1,700' above ground, and top reported by pilot) by 1600 CWT. This was the situation at briefing time. By 1730 CWT the base of the overcast had lowered to an 800' ceiling and was beginning to lift. At 1800 CWT ceiling was 900', and by 1830 CWT it had lifted to 1,000'. The 1830 CWT observation is the closest observation to the time of the accident. By 2230 CWT the moon was visibile through the clouds and the sky had begun to break.

4. Other weather elements for the same period: Visibility was 8 miles at Salina from 1300 CWT to 1530 CWT at which time it lowered to 5 miles because of haze. Visibility continued to be 5 miles until 2130 CWT at which time it improved to 6 miles and to 8 miles at 2300 CWT. Surface winds were south-southwest 3 mph at 1300 CWT, calm from 1330 to 1430 CWT and north-northwest rest of period, with velocity 25 mph at time of accident. Winds at 5,000' MSL: 330 deg 25 mph (estimated from the 1815 CWT pilot balloon chart). Freezing level: the freezing level was estimated to have been 3,000' MSL at 1300 CWT, but had lowered to ground elevation by 1820 CWT. Turbulence: Turbulence was reported by pilot landing at 1700 CWT to be light. -21-

CONFIDENTIAL

Incl. 13

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[illegible] 1300 to 2400 CWT 20 Nov 44 (CONT'D.)

[illegible]
Captain, Air Corps
Station Weather Officer

A TRUE COPY:

Clark A. Tate
CLARK A. TATE
Major, Air Corps

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CONFIDENTIAL

Incl. 13²

CONFIDENTIAL

PLACE: Kansas - Saline - Ascaria 6 Miles Southwest Smoky Hill Army Air Field.

DATE: 28 November 1944.

AIRCRAFT NO: 42-24578

PILOT'S NAME: Captain Alan M. Miller

SECTION G - PARAGRAPH #10 - STATEMENT OF ENGINEERING OFFICER, MECHANICS, AND OTHERS AS TO WHAT FAILED AND PROBABLE REASONS WHY

2. No. 3 guide was severely burned; it should have been changed. There were cracks on the face of the exhaust valve.

3. On No. 7 the oil hold in the adjusting screw was lined up with the slot in the rocker arm, which means that that might possibly have run dry.

4. On No. 17 the exhaust guide was severely burned.

The following conditions existed on No. 2 engine:

1. On No. 17 the exhaust guide bushing was burned almost in half, the valve was not seating at all with the guide in this condition.

2. There were several exhaust valve seats severely burned, which a compression check would have disclosed, a condition which indicates that probably a compression check had not been made in this engine, or an incorrect compression check was made. There was excessive guide wear in No. 3 exhaust guide valve; excessive wear in No. 6 exhaust guide; exhaust valve tip on No. 9 was gouged severely, and the roller was chipped, which could have been detected by visual inspection. It is the opinion that the crash did not cause these conditions, as numerous cylinders were damaged severely and some of the guides were in normal condition.

490

Both fuel shut off valves, No. 2 and No. 3 engines, were found to be closed. According to extracts from Form 41B, the airplane had been on a red diagonal for approximately one week, with extremely high fuel pressure on No. 2; however, this condition had been corrected by bleeding the line and and on subsequent flights it seemed to work normally. It is quite possible that excessive fuel pressure was built up in No. 2 engine and forced a leak around the hose clamp, furnishing fuel for the fire; however, there is no concrete evidence to substantiate this supposition.

-3-

Incl 2

The condition of the valves on No. 3 were such that they could have caused the rough running and backfiring that was reported prior to feathering.

The fire extinguisher was never pulled on No. 2 engine. The Flight Engineer asked the Pilot if he should pull it; the pilot did not answer, and it is only after discretion of the Pilot that the fire extinguisher be used.

Douglass Symington
DOUGLASS SYMINGTON
Major, Air Corps
Director of Maintenance

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PLACE: Kansas - Saline - Assaria - 6 miles Southwest Smoky Hill Army Air Field.

DATE: 28 November 1944.

AIRCRAFT NO: 42-24578.

PILOT'S NAME: Captain Alan M. Miller.

SECTION M - DESCRIPTION OF THE ACCIDENT (Cont'd)

the well instead of bailing out and the flight engineer reached over and kicked him out. The tail gunner was operating the panel with the flight engineer (indoctrination); he secured his chute and the flight engineer pushed him out. That is four of them; the flight engineer was the last one to leave the ship. When he left, the pilot was still standing and yelling for someone to bring him his chute. The other radio operator came forward and he evidently went back to get the pilot's chute and was killed. The Flight Engineer bailed out at 2300 feet; bombardier at 2000 feet. The navigator, in his testimony, said the airspeed went up to 240 mph and then dropped back to 140 mph, which would indicate it was completely out of control, just diving and climbing. Whether or not the pilot ever got back in his seat couldn't be determined. The navigator also testified that just before he hit the ground, it looked as though the airplane flew along level a short distance and then suddenly dived into the ground. From the looks of the wreckage and the surrounding trees and ground, the airplane came in with the right wing tip very low and clipped a tree and crashed in an inverted position. The line of flight was toward the Southwest. As the ship crashed the tail section broke off from the fuselage and came to rest in the center of the wreckage, again indicating that the ship came in at a steep angle. There was no indication that the ship came in in a flat glide at all.

~~RESTRICTED~~

Incl. 3

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PLACE: Kansas - Saline - Assaria - 6 miles Southwest Smoky Hill Army Air Field.

DATE: 28 November 1944.

AIRCRAFT NO. 42-24578.

PILOT'S NAME: Captain Alan M. Miller

SECTION M - PARAGRAPH 3 - ACTION TAKEN (CONT'D)

what exit he will use and in what order he will leave the airplane; this to be done every time the crew is scheduled to fly, regardless of whether that crew actually flies.

b. Before any crew flies again the Squadron Commander, Operations Officer, or an Instructor Pilot will check the entire crew on proper bail out procedure.

c. Airplane Commanders will see to it that every man aboard the airplane wears his parachute or harness at all times, and in case of detachable packs will keep same within arm's reach. Violations of this procedure will be immediately reported by all instructors and supervisory personnel and will result in disciplinary action.

d. Airplane Commanders will write out and memorize emergency procedure as set forth in "B-29 Standard Operating Procedure for Pilots." Briefing officers will call on any crew member to stand up and give the correct emergency procedure from memory.

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-6-

~~RESTRICTED~~

e. Inspection of hose clamp connections between fuel pump and carburetor has been made a part of daily inspection at this station.

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Incl. 4

WAR DEPARTMENT
AAF Form No. 23
(REVISED AUG. ...)

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ARMY AIR FORCES AIRCRAFT CLEARANCE

A OPERATIONS OFFICE: Smoky Hill Army Air Field, Salina, Kansas

ADDRESS

DATE: 11-28-44

B PILOT'S NAME	RANK	HOME STATION	ORGANIZATION	AIRCRAFT NUMBER
Miller	Capt.	SHA AF	39th Bomb Gp. 60th Squadron	578

NAME, INITIALS, RANK, HOME STATION OF OTHER OCCUPANTS

Anderson, J. W.	Nanrino
Phillips, L.	Fries
Barthel, W.	Gavin
Shope, P.	Gilbert
McCauley, J.	Garnier
Charles, E. T.	Vanderpoole
Bennett, W.	DeMoss

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:
[signature]
EUGENE S. SAPIRO
1st Lt., Air Corps
Asst. Operations Off.

LIST ADDITIONAL PASSENGERS ON SEPARATE SHEET

C WEATHER DATA

EXISTING LOCAL

EXISTING ROUTE

DESTINATION (LATEST) — TIME

ALTERNATE (LATEST) — TIME

WEATHER GIVEN AT BRIEFING
/s/ R. L. HOWARD
Major, AC
60th Operations.

ALTIMETER SETTINGS: LOCAL / DESTINATION / ALTERNATE / RESET ALTIMETER BEFORE APPROACH

FORECASTS (ESTIMATED FLIGHT TIME PLUS 2 HOURS)

ROUTE

DESTINATION

ALTERNATE

WINDS ALOFT—GIVE ALTITUDE, DIRECTION, VELOCITY, AS PILOT REQUESTS

AAF FORM 23A REQUIRED ☐ NOT REQUIRED ☐ FORECASTER — TIME

D FLIGHT PLAN (PILOT COMPLETES)

RADIO CALLS	TYPE OF AIRCRAFT	PILOT (LAST NAME ONLY)	POINT OF DEPARTURE
578	B-29	Miller	SHAAF

1	2	3	4
ALT. 5000	ALT.	ALT.	ALT.
☐ CFR ☒ IFR	☐ CFR ☐ IFR	☐ CFR ☐ IFR	☐ CFR ☐ IFR
ROUTE local	ROUTE	ROUTE	ROUTE
TO range	TO	TO	TO

AIRPORT OF FIRST INTENDED LANDING: SHAAF

TRUE AIR SPEED: 200

TRANSMITTING FREQUENCIES: 4495 / 7215 KC.; 6210 / 132 Mgs. MC

RECEIVER ONLY ☐ NO RADIO ☐

PROPOSED TAKE-OFF TIME: 1800

EST. TIME EN ROUTE: 7:00

ALTERNATE AIRPORT: Liberal, Kans.

HOURS OF FUEL (CRUISING): 10:30

INSTRUMENT RATING: NONE ☐ TYPE

FLIGHT PRIORITY

REMARKS: SHOW FIXES WHICH WILL BE REPORTED WHILE ON INSTRUMENT FLIGHT.

490

PILOT'S SIGNATURE: /s/ A. M. Miller

TOWER FREQUENCIES: DESTINATION 396 KC. ALTERNATE 219 KC.

WEATHER CODE RECEIVED: XXXXXXXX

MILEAGE: TO DESTINATION 0; DEST. TO ALTERNATE 200

☐ COMMAND PILOT ☐ SENIOR PILOT ☐ CONTRACT PILOT OF CARGO AIRCRAFT ☒ PILOT

E FLIGHT CLEARANCE AUTHORIZATION

SUBMITTED TO	TIME	BY
A T C	1845	MC

TIME APPROVAL RECEIVED: 1845

CONTROL INSTRUCTIONS RECEIVED

/s/ R. L. Howard
CLEARING AUTHORITY
Major, AC

OPERATIONS IDENTIFICATION No.

INSTRUCTIONS AND APPROVAL TRANSMITTED TO PILOT OR TOWER BY: Incl. 5

ACTUAL TAKE-OFF TIME: 1819

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CLEARANCE OFFICER.